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FAKE NEWS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 
RECONCILING A DISCONNECT BETWEEN THEORY AND 
DOCTRINE 
By  
Clay Calvert,*  Stephanie McNeff,**  
Austin Vining,‡ & Sebastian Zarate‡‡ 
Abstract 
This Article analyzes calls for regulating so-called 
“fake news” through the lens of both traditional 
theories of free expression – namely, the 
marketplace of ideas and democratic self-
governance – and two well-established First 
Amendment doctrines, strict scrutiny and 
underinclusivity.  The Article argues there is, at 
first glance, a seeming disconnect between theory 
and doctrine when it comes to either censoring or 
safeguarding fake news.  The Article contends, 
however, that a structural rights interpretation of 
the First Amendment offers a viable means of 
reconciling theory and doctrine.  A structural 
rights approach focuses on the dangers of 
collective power in defining the truth, rather than 
on the benefits that messages provide to society or 
individuals.  Ultimately, a structural rights 
conception illustrates why, at the level of free 
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speech theory, the government must not censor fake 
news.  
INTRODUCTION 
“And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the 
earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and 
prohibiting to misdoubt her strength.  Let her and Falsehood grapple; 
who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?”1 
 
John Milton penned this often-quoted passage more than 370 years 
ago, planting the seed for “the oldest of the rationales for the principle of 
freedom of expression”2—the metaphorical marketplace of ideas.3  
Unfortunately, he never could have imagined the hoopla,4 if not utter 
panic, among some people regarding fake news in the months 
surrounding the 2016 United States presidential election.5 
Indeed, a January 2017 report by U.S. intelligence officials concluded 
that Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin, deployed “an aggressive mix 
of digital thefts and leaks, fake news and propaganda”6 to disrupt the 
2016 presidential campaign and to tilt it in favor of Republican Donald 
J. Trump.  For some liberals and Democrats, fake news became a reason 
– more cynically, an excuse – why Hillary Clinton lost to Trump.7   
 
 1. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING 
45 (MacMillan 1959) (H.B. Cotterill, ed.) (1644). 
 2. C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment is Not Preferred: The Military and Other 
“Special Contexts,” 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 786 (1988). 
 3. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) (“The 
‘marketplace of ideas’ is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech tradition.”). 
 4. Nina Agrawal, Back Story; Where Fake News Came From, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2016, at A2 
(“Despite all the hoopla about fake news – President Obama has denounced it and Facebook has pledged 
to rein in websites that spread it – the phenomenon is not new”) (emphasis added). 
 5. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, Media’s Next Challenge: Overcoming the Threat of Fake News, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2016, at B1 (“The internet-borne forces that are eating away at print advertising are 
enabling a host of faux-journalistic players to pollute the democracy with dangerously fake news 
items.”) (emphasis added); Margaret Sullivan, Sick of the News? This is No Time to Tune Out, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 8, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/sick-of-the-news-this-is-no-time-
to-tune-out/2016/12/08/97ff1e70-bd61-11e6-91ee-1adddfe36cbe_story.html8, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/sick-of-the-news-this-is-no-time-to-tune-
out/2016/12/08/97ff1e70-bd61-11e6-91ee-1adddfe36cbe_story.html (asserting that the United States 
today is facing “the era of fake news causing real trouble”) (emphasis added). 
 6. Brian Bennett, Report Points to Putin, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2016, at A1 (emphasis added). 
 7. Michael Wolff, Fake News is a Real Pawn in Claims of Media Bias; New Genre Targets an 
Unsuspecting, Susceptible Audience, USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 2016, at 1B (asserting that “the ‘fake news’ 
notion has become part of the epistemological phenomenon offered by liberal media to explain why 
Donald Trump was elected and, therefore, to discredit that election.  In this, fake news becomes part of a 
broader conspiracy theory of unseen forces manipulating a gullible public”); Teri Sforza, Fake News 
Has Real Impact, DAILY NEWS (L.A., Cal.), Dec. 18, 2016, at A1 (“How big a problem is it?  On the 
2
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For example, John Herrman contended in the New York Times that 
“[f]or many people, and especially opponents of President-elect Donald 
J. Trump, the attention paid to fake news and its role in the election has 
provided a small relief, the discovery of the error that explains 
everything.”8  A USA Today column also declared that fake news “on 
social media is what a growing chorus of journalists, liberals and tech 
leaders at least partially blame for Donald Trump’s election victory.”9  
Steve Deace, a conservative radio talk-show host, opined in the same 
column that “the Trump campaign shamelessly rode a wave of fake 
news sites to help it corral a gullible public.”10  On the other end of the 
political spectrum, left-leaning New York Times columnist Paul 
Krugman similarly considered fake news to be a big problem.11 
More significantly, Hillary Clinton asserted in December 2016 that an 
“epidemic of malicious fake news”12 posed “a danger that must be 
addressed and addressed quickly.”13  The former presidential nominee 
even “voiced support for some federal legislation to address the ‘fake 
news’ issue.”14   
In fact, the Federal Trade Commission has targeted fake news 
websites designed to sell “bogus weight-loss products”15 and acai berry 
supplements as forms of deceptive advertising.16  However, the 
 
left, some say fake news pushed people to make Donald Trump the most powerful man on Earth.”).  
 8. John Herrman, Fixation on Fake News Overshadows Waning Trust in Real Reporting, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/business/media/exposing-fake-news-
eroding-trust-in-real-reporting.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/business/media/exposing-fake-
news-eroding-trust-in-real-reporting.html.  
 9. Steve Deace, Who Left Us Vulnerable to Fake News?, USA TODAY, Nov. 25, 2016, at 13A. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Paul Krugman, The Age of Fake Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2016, at A19, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/opinion/the-age-of-fake-policy.html (“And I’m not talking about 
‘fake news,’ as big a problem as that is becoming; I’m talking about respectable, mainstream news 
coverage.”) (emphasis added). 
 12. Noam Scheiber et al., Trump is Still Not Very Popular, and His Problem with Women Could 
Return, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/us/politics/donald-trump-
transition.html.  
 13. Id.  
 14. Paul Kane, Hillary Clinton Attacks ‘Fake News’ in Post-election Appearance on Capitol 
Hill, WASH. POST, Dec. 8. 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/12/08/hillary-clinton-attacks-fake-news-in-
post-election-appearance-on-capitol-hill.  
 15. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Charges Marketers Used Massive Spam 
Campaign to Pitch Bogus Weight-Loss Products (June 6, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2016/06/ftc-charges-marketers-used-massive-spam-campaign-pitch-bogus. 
 16. See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Permanently Stops Fake News Website 
Operator that Allegedly Deceived Consumers about Acai Berry Weight-Loss Products (Feb. 7, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/02/ftc-permanently-stops-fake-news-website-
operator-allegedly (“The marketers behind an online scheme that the Federal Trade Commission 
charged with deceptively using fake news websites to market acai berry supplements and other weight-
loss products have agreed to pay more than $1.6 million in settlements that will permanently halt their 
3
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possibility of a law banning or censoring fake news unrelated to product 
ads raises significant First Amendment17 hurdles.  Those concerns are 
particularly problematic to the extent that fake news affects politics, as 
was feared during the 2016 presidential election.  Political speech, after 
all, resides at the core of the First Amendment.18   
Addressing some of the dangers to free speech posed by regulating 
fake news, former U.S. Congressman and presidential candidate Ron 
Paul asserts that “[t]he latest, and potentially most dangerous, threat to 
the First Amendment is the war on ‘fake news.’  Those leading the war 
are using a few ‘viral’ internet hoaxes to justify increased government 
regulation – and even outright censorship – of internet news sites.”19  He 
adds that “[t]hose calling for bans on ‘fake news’ are not just trying to 
censor easily disproved Internet hoaxes.  They are working to create a 
government-sanctioned ‘gatekeeper’ with the power to censor any news 
or opinion displeasing to the political establishment.”20 
Fake news and its suppression are clearly controversial.  Precisely 
what constitutes fake news, however, is murky.  There is no single, 
agreed upon definition.21  One New York Times story reports that fake 
news is “widely understood to refer to fabricated news accounts that are 
meant to spread virally online.”22  Yet Carl Cannon, executive editor of 
RealClearPolitics, observes that “the definition is vague”23 and that the 
term “is being used promiscuously.”24   
Others also contend that “‘fake news’ is fuzzy. It can refer to a 
multitude of problems, including disinformation, propaganda, [and] 
 
operation.”).  
 17. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The 
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than ninety years ago through the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local 
government entities and officials.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 18. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (“If the First Amendment has 
any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply 
engaging in political speech.”); Monitor Patriot v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (observing that when 
it comes to the First Amendment freedom of speech, “it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional 
guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political 
office”). 
 19. Ron Paul, Fake News, Free Speech, PUB. OPINION (Chambersburg, Pa.), Dec. 14, 2016, at 
A9,  reprinted at http://www.publicopiniononline.com/story/opinion/2016/12/13/fake-news-free-
speech/95366720.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Ethan Baron, Google Hasn’t Kept Ads Off Sites Peddling Fake News, DAYTON DAILY NEWS 
(Ohio), Dec. 17, 2016, at A8 (observing that “defining ‘fake’ news can be difficult”). 
 22. Jeremy W. Peters, Wielding Claims of ‘Fake News,’ Conservatives Take Aim at Mainstream 
Media, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2016, at A11. 
 23. Carl M. Cannon, The Age of Disinformation, DAILY NEWS (L.A., Cal.), Dec. 18, 2016, at 
A15. 
 24. Id.  
4
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conspiracy-mongering.”25 Fake news can even sweep up satirical news 
articles.26  At its broadest, fake news is “an all-purpose insult for news 
coverage a person doesn’t like.”27  
Conversely, when “[n]arrowly defined, ‘fake news’ means a made-up 
story with an intention to deceive, often geared toward getting clicks.”28  
In a similarly narrow vein, Washington Post columnist Margaret 
Sullivan calls fake news “deliberately constructed lies, in the form of 
news articles, meant to mislead the public.”29 
For purposes of this Article, fake news is narrowly defined.  It 
includes only articles that suggest, by both their appearance and 
content,30 the conveyance of real news,31 and that knowingly include at 
least one material32 factual assertion that is empirically verifiable as 
 
 25. Margaret Sullivan, Feds Should Stay out of Fight Against Fake News, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 
2016, at C1. 
 26. Abby Ohlheiser, How the War Against Fake News Backfired, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/12/07/how-the-war-against-fake-news-
backfired.  
 27. Neil Irwin, Fake News? Welcome to ‘False Remembering,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2017, at 
2017, at A3.  President Donald Trump, for instance, broadly tars and feathers entire news media outlets 
as fake news organizations.  For example, in February 2017 he tweeted, “The fake news media is going 
crazy with their conspiracy theories and blind hatred.  @MSNBC & @CNN are unwatchable.  
@foxandfriends is great!” David Jackson & Kevin Johnson, White House Faces an Onslaught, USA 
TODAY, Feb. 16, 2017, at 1A.  See Nicholas Kristof, What Did Trump Know?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
2017, at A27 (noting that “Trump lashes out wildly at ‘the fake news media’ without answering 
questions”). 
 28. Sabrina Tavernise, As Fake News Spreads Lies, More Readers Shrug at Truth, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 7, 2016, at A1. 
 29. Margaret Sullivan, It’s Time to Retire the Tainted Term ‘Fake News,’ WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 
2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/its-time-to-retire-the-tainted-term-fake-
news/2017/01/06/a5a7516c-d375-11e6-945a-76f69a399dd5_story.html?utm_term=.146db39702b1.  
 30. This part of the definition, regarding what an article suggests by its appearance and content, 
employs a reasonable reader standard akin to that in defamation law.  See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker 
Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 515 (1991) (concluding that the meaning of a statement in defamation law 
must be made “by reference to the meaning a statement conveys to a reasonable reader”); Lynch v. New 
Jersey Educ. Ass’n, 735 A.2d 1129 (N.J. 1999) (“If a statement has more than a literal meaning, the 
critical consideration is what a reasonable reader would understand the statement to mean.”).  
 31. Defining “news” as a stand-alone concept is itself difficult, of course.  See, e.g., Robert M. 
Entman, The Nature and Sources of News, in THE PRESS 48, 51 (Geneva Overholser & Kathleen Hall 
Jamieson eds. 2005) (“Journalists, scholars, and educated people have long thought of news as a more or 
less self-evident category of media product – the stuff that appears in newspapers, newsmagazines, or on 
TV shows that have the word ‘news’ in their titles.”); KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & KARLYN KOHRS 
CAMPBELL, THE INTERPLAY OF INFLUENCE: NEWS, ADVERTISING, POLITICS AND THE INTERNET 40 (6th 
ed. 2006) (“Just what is news?  Despite many efforts, no neat, satisfactory answer to that question can 
be given.”).  A complete discussion of what constitutes news is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 32. The idea that fake news, under this definition, must involve “material” falsity – rather than 
minor falsity – borrows, in part, from a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision affecting defamation law.  
See Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852, 861 (2014) (“Indeed, we have required more than 
mere falsity to establish actual malice: The falsity must be ‘material.’”).  Additionally, the Federal Trade 
Commission uses a materiality standard in considering if a misrepresentation or omission of a fact is 
actionable.  See Fanning v. FTC, 821 F.3d 164, 172 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 648 
5
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false and that is not otherwise protected by the fair report privilege.33  
Put slightly differently, to constitute fake news under this definition, an 
article’s publisher must act with the subjective state of mind that 
satisfies the first half of the actual malice test adopted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.34  That facet of 
actual malice requires proving an article was published “with knowledge 
that it was false.”35  The definition’s notion of verifiable falsity, which 
also borrows from libel law,36 reflects the idea that fake news, as used 
here, does not pertain to expressions of opinion.    
For example, the much publicized story that Pope Francis endorsed 
Trump for president fits this Article’s definition of fake news.37 First, it 
was a factual assertion and, in turn, one that was verified as false by the 
Pope proclaiming at a news conference “he would not endorse any 
candidate.”38  Second, the falsity was material because such an 
endorsement might well have influenced some voters.  Third, the story’s 
creators published it knowing it was false.39 
 
(Jan. 9, 2017) (“The FTC Act imposes liability for misrepresentations only if they are material.”); Kraft, 
Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 970 F.2d 311, 322 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A claim is considered material if it 
‘involves information that is important to consumers and, hence, likely to affect their choice of, or 
conduct regarding a product.’”) (quoting In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, *107 (1984)). 
 33. Exempting falsities that fall within the scope of the fair report privilege from the statute’s 
definition of fake news is both strategic and crucial.  That’s because the fair report privilege – in stark 
contrast to fake news – actually “promotes our system of self-governance by serving the public’s 
interest in official proceedings.” Solaia Tech., LLC v. Specialty Publ’g Co., 852 N.E.2d 825, 842 (Ill. 
2006).  As Dean Rodney Smolla explains, “[t]he rationale for the privilege is of considerable vintage, 
but remains as relevant as ever: The reporter is a surrogate for the public, permitting it to observe 
through the reporter’s eyes how the business of government is being conducted.” RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 
THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 8:67 (2d ed., Rel. 25, Apr. 2012).  Put differently, the fair report privilege 
exists to enlighten voters, not to confuse them.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977) 
(“The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or 
proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if 
the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.”). 
 34. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 35. Id. at 280.  The second half of the test for actual malice asks whether the publisher of an 
article acted “with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id.  
 36. See Kahn v. Bower, 284 Cal. Rptr. 244, 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (observing that “it is a 
question of law for the court whether a challenged statement is reasonably susceptible of an 
interpretation which implies a provably false assertion of actual fact”) (emphasis added). 
 37. See Paul Davidson & Kevin McCoy, Top 10 Business Stories of 2016, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 
2016, at 1B (“A post-election analysis by BuzzFeed found that fake stories shared on Facebook 
outperformed real news stories during the final three months of the campaign cycle.  The most shared 
story was a fake report about Pope Francis’ endorsement of then-Republican nominee Trump.”); David 
Zurawik, Fake News a Symptom of Sickness in Media Ecosystem, BALT. SUN, Nov. 20, 2016, at E1 
(identifying the story that Pope Francis endorsed Donald Trump as one of the two biggest false election 
stories). 
 38. Agrawal, supra note 4, at A2. 
 39. The story was created on a website called WTOE 5 News that “owns up to being a fake news 
website.” Sydney Schaedel, Did the Pope Endorse Trump?, FACTCHECK.ORG, Oct. 24, 2016, 
http://www.factcheck.org/2016/10/did-the-pope-endorse-trump.  
6
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With this definition and example of fake news in mind, the Article 
explores the constitutionality of a hypothetical federal statute that: (1) 
criminalizes the knowing40 creation and dissemination in interstate 
commerce41 of fake news42 that purports to be about matters of public 
concern;43 and (2) is intended to serve the dual interests of preventing 
confused decision-making in voting choices and safeguarding 
democratic self-governance during the voting process.44  The Article 
analyzes this fictional statute from the perspective of both the First 
Amendment doctrine and the free speech theory.   
Specifically, the Article argues that while such a statute almost 
certainly is unconstitutional under the doctrines of strict scrutiny and 
underinclusiveness, traditional understandings of both the marketplace 
of ideas and democratic self-governance theories of free expression do 
not support shielding fake news from government censorship.  For 
instance, if in philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn’s view the 
twin points of ultimate interest in protecting political speech are “the 
minds of the hearers”45 and “the voting of wise decisions,”46 then fake 
news goes unprotected because it potentially confuses the minds of 
 
 40. The “knowing” requirement is mandated per the necessity of a mens rea component in a 
criminal statute such as the hypothetical one considered here.  See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
2001, 2009 (2015) (“The ‘central thought’ is that a defendant must be ‘blameworthy in mind’ before he 
can be found guilty, a concept courts have expressed over time through various terms such as mens rea, 
scienter, malice aforethought, guilty knowledge, and the like.”) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 
342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952)) (emphasis in original). 
 41. The movement of these messages in interstate commerce provides the jurisdictional peg for 
federal regulation.  See Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1624 (2016) (“In our federal system, 
‘Congress cannot punish felonies generally’; it may enact only those criminal laws that are connected to 
one of its constitutionally enumerated powers, such as the authority to regulate interstate commerce.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 42. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (defining fake news for purposes of this 
statute).  The statute applies only to the original creator and publisher of the story, not to individuals or 
entities that later forward it to others.  The statute includes a defense for publishers of satire if those 
publishers make it clear, either on their home pages or with disclaimers in the articles themselves, that 
their articles are satire and not to be taken seriously.  A complete discussion of these provisions is 
beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on the apparent disconnect between First Amendment 
theory and doctrine when it comes to any efforts to regulate fake news. 
 43. To eliminate the issue of the possible vagueness of the term “public concern,” the statute 
adopts and incorporates the U.S. Supreme Court’s own definition adopted in Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 
443 (2011).  The Court held in Snyder that “[s]peech deals with matters of public concern when it can 
‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,’ . . 
. or when it ‘is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and 
concern to the public.’” Id. at 453 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983), and San Diego 
v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004)) (citations omitted). 
 44. These two interests are asserted here because they reflect the genuine concerns of many 
people that fake news may have affected voters and influenced the outcome of the 2016 presidential 
election.  Supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text. 
 45. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 
(1948). 
 46. Id.  
7
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those who hear it. In turn, fake news may cause them to vote unwisely.  
Furthermore, in Meiklejohn’s words, “what is essential is not that 
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.”47  
Those who create fake news, as defined in this Article, can be censored 
as speakers under a Meiklejohnian view because fake news simply is not 
worth saying. 
In brief, First Amendment doctrine seemingly protects fake news but 
free speech theory, at first blush, does not.  This Article concludes, 
however, that by adopting what the late Professor Steven Gey called “a 
structural rights interpretation of the First Amendment,”48 rather than 
“our persistent reliance on an individual rights conception,”49 one can 
reconcile doctrine and theory such that both safeguard fake news from 
censorship.  As Gey later asserted, “[t]he structural rights perspective 
does a much better job of explaining the expansive scope and speech-
protectiveness of modern First Amendment jurisprudence than the 
individual rights justifications that the Court continues to rely on in its 
opinions.”50 
Part I of this Article initially provides an overview of the strict 
scrutiny and underinclusiveness doctrines.51  It also argues that the 
hypothetical statute regulating fake news described above would likely 
be unconstitutional under those two standards.  This is especially 
probable in light of the Supreme Court’s rigorous and newfound “direct 
causal link”52 requirement between speech and harm, as well as its 
decision in United States v. Alvarez53 suggesting that counterspeech 
typically is the proper remedy for correcting certain deliberate 
falsehoods.54  Part II then offers a brief overview of the marketplace of 
ideas and democratic self-governance theories of free expression, and it 
avers that neither theory shields fake news from government 
regulation.55   
Next, Part III argues that this seeming disconnect – First Amendment 
doctrine safeguarding fake news from censorship versus free speech 
theory offering, at most, negligible support for protecting it – is 
 
 47. Id.  
 48. Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless Untruths, 
36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2008). 
 49. Id. at 3.  
 50. Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 10 
(2009). 
 51. Infra notes 59-180 and accompanying text. 
 52. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011); United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. 
Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012). 
 53. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 54. See id. at 2549. 
 55. Infra notes 181-257 and accompanying text. 
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reconciled by embracing a structural rights interpretation of the First 
Amendment.56  Finally, Part IV concludes that private efforts to combat 
fake news, including counterspeech, self-regulation and media-literacy 
education, are far superior to creating a government agency vested with 
Orwellian authority57 to determine what news is true and false and, in 
turn, to censor the latter.58   
I. A DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS OF CENSORING FAKE NEWS: 
WHY THE HYPOTHETICAL STATUTE FAILS STRICT SCRUTINY  
AND IS FATALLY UNDERINCLUSIVE 
 
This Part has two sections.  Section A initially examines the 
hypothetical fake news statute through the lens of strict scrutiny, while 
Section B addresses issues of underinclusivity. 
A. Strict Scrutiny 
A trio of well-established tests – strict scrutiny,59 intermediate 
scrutiny,60 and rational basis review61 – generally governs as-applied 
 
 56. Infra notes 258-290 and accompanying text. 
 57. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992) (1949).  The book’s 
protagonist, Winston Smith, works for the fictional and totalitarian government of Oceania’s Ministry of 
Truth, which, as the late Chief Justice of the United States William Rehnquist once wrote, “deals in 
lies.”  William H. Rehnquist, Survey of Book, 102 MICH. L. REV. 981, 981 (2004) (reviewing GEORGE 
ORWELL, 1984) (Plume, Centennial Ed. 2003) (1949). 
 58. Infra notes 291-312 and accompanying text. 
 59. See infra notes 72-79 (describing strict scrutiny in greater detail). 
 60. See Leslie Kendrick, Nonsense on Sidewalks: Content Discrimination in McCullen v. 
Coakley, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 238 (2014) (remarking that intermediate scrutiny “has historically 
required that the law be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest’ and that it leave 
open ‘ample alternative channels of communication’”) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 791 (1989)); R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A 
Distinction That is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081, 2084 (2015) (noting that “content-
neutral regulations commonly receive less exacting, less demanding, mid-level judicial scrutiny” that 
typically requires the government to demonstrate “a significant or substantial government interest” 
being served by a “reasonable or proportionate” statute that leaves open ample alternative modes of 
communication). 
 61. Variations of rational basis review are limited in First Amendment jurisprudence to special  
settings and groups of individuals, such as the speech rights of prison inmates and public school 
students.  See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that “when a prison regulation impinges 
on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests”); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (concluding “that 
educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content 
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”); see also David M. Shapiro, Lenient in Theory, Dumb in 
Fact: Prison, Speech, and Scrutiny, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 972, 982 (2016) (calling the Turner test for 
prisoner speech rights “a standard much lower than the strict scrutiny or even intermediate scrutiny 
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challenges in First Amendment jurisprudence.62  Strict scrutiny, 
ostensibly the most rigorous test,63 pertains to content-based speech 
restrictions.64  The U.S. Supreme Court recently explained in Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert65 that a law is content based if it “applies to particular 
speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message 
expressed”66 or “target[s] speech based on its communicative content.”67  
Writing for the Reed majority, Justice Clarence Thomas added that “the 
phrase ‘content based’ requires a court to consider whether a regulation 
of speech ‘on its face’ draws distinctions based on the message a 
speaker conveys.”68 
This Article’s hypothetical statute regulating fake news69 easily falls 
within this definition.  It not only targets a particular type of message 
and topic – fake news70 – but also restrains fake news that concerns only 
specific subjects – namely, matters of public concern.71  Thus, the 
statute is content based and subject to strict scrutiny. 
 
ordinarily applied to First Amendment claims in other contexts”); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the 
New Three Rs – Repression, Rights, and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. 
REV. 119, 122 (1995) (dubbing the Court’s Hazelwood standard “essentially a rational basis test” and 
adding that “when school-sponsored speech is involved, government need act with only minimal 
rationality”). 
 62. See R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, 
Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 291 (2016) (noting that 
modern doctrine utilizes “strict scrutiny, intermediate review, [and] ‘reasonableness’ balancing”); 
Christina E. Wells, Trends in First Amendment Jurisprudence: Beyond Campaign Finance: The First 
Amendment Implications of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 66 MO. L. REV. 141, 158 
(2001) (describing a “multi-tiered system of judicial review” in constitutional law consisting “of three 
levels of scrutiny – strict, intermediate, and rational basis – all of which share the same general 
structure”). 
 63. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015) (upholding a state judicial 
canon in the face of strict scrutiny, but calling the result “one of the rare cases in which a speech 
restriction withstands strict scrutiny”) (emphasis added); but see Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in 
Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. 
L. & POL’Y 349, 377 (2011) (contending strict scrutiny “is arguably a weaker judicial tool today for 
measuring the constitutionality of laws targeting speech than it was in the past.  Although still strongly 
protective of expression, there is at least some evidence that the test lacks the rigor for which it once was 
noted”). 
 64. See David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 363 
(2015) (noting “the longstanding default rule that strict scrutiny applies to content-based restrictions on 
speech”). 
 65. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 66. Id. at 2227. 
 67. Id. at 2226. 
 68. Id. at 2227. 
 69. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (setting forth the hypothetical statute). 
 70. See supra notes 30-33 (providing the hypothetical statute’s definition of fake news). 
 71. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (limiting the hypothetical statute’s reach to speech 
about matters of “public concern” and invoking the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of that term from 
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)). 
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In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,72 the Court held 
that a statute survives strict scrutiny only if “it is justified by a 
compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that 
interest.”73  This test involves two prongs: (1) proving a compelling 
interest, and (2) demonstrating that the means serving it are sufficiently 
narrowly tailored.74 
To satisfy the first part, the government “must specifically identify an 
‘actual problem’ in need of solving”75 and prove there is, in fact, “a 
direct causal link between”76 the regulated speech and the harm it 
allegedly causes.  As the Court wrote in United States v. Playboy 
Entertainment Group,77 “the Government must present more than 
anecdote and supposition.”78  Furthermore, the late Justice Antonin 
Scalia pointed out in Brown that even when a causal effect is proven, it 
does not justify regulation if the impact is “small and indistinguishable 
from effects produced by other media.”79 
The hypothetical fake news statute asserts two compelling interests – 
“preventing confused decision-making in voting choices and 
safeguarding democratic self-governance during the voting process.”80  
The former rationale resides at the micro level – protecting people from 
fake news that causes them to vote differently from how they would 
have voted if they had not been exposed to fake news.  The latter 
justification, in contrast, exists at the macro level – stopping overall 
election results in a democratic society from changing due to fake news. 
There is little doubt, at least superficially, that these interests appear 
compelling.  After all, a fair democratic society requires voters to 
understand policies and to make informed decisions.81  As Alexander 
Meiklejohn contended, the goal of free speech in a democratic society is 
“the voting of wise decisions.”82  Borrowing Meiklejohn’s own words, 
 
 72. 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 73. Id. at 799 (emphasis added). 
 74. See generally R. George Wright, Electoral Lies and the Broader Problems of Strict Scrutiny, 
64 FLA. L. REV. 759, 777 (2012) (identifying strict scrutiny as having “two prongs” and specifying the 
first prong as requiring a “compelling government interest” and the second prong as requiring 
“sufficiently narrow tailoring”). 
 75. Brown, 564 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 
822 (2000)). 
 76. Id.  See also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012) (“There must be a direct 
causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”). 
 77. 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
 78. Id. at 822. 
 79. Brown, 564 U.S. at 800-01.  
 80. Supra note 44. 
 81. Jennifer L. Hochschild, If Democracies Need Informed Voters, How Can They Thrive While 
Expanding Enfranchisement?, 9 ELECTION L. J.: RULES, POL. & POL’Y 111, 111 (2010). 
 82. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 45, at 25. 
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fake news seemingly contributes to the “mutilation of the thinking 
process of the community”83 of voters.  The overall outcome of an 
election, one hopes, would not be swayed and determined by fake news. 
Yet, strict scrutiny requires proving a “direct causal link”84 to 
demonstrate that fake news is, in fact, “an ‘actual problem’ in need of 
solving.”85  In other words, the government must establish that fake 
news truly causes vote-changing confusion (the micro-level harm) and 
directly changes the outcome of elections (the macro-level harm).  
Anecdotal evidence will not cut the constitutional mustard.86  As Justice 
Scalia wrote in Brown, “ambiguous proof will not suffice.”87 
Fake news certainly is blamed for causing a few high-profile 
incidents.  Most notably, there was a shooting at a pizzeria in which a 
man was more than a little confused, if not completely bamboozled, by 
fake news.88  Thus, it is clear some people believe fake news. There 
simply is, however, no empirical proof of a direct causal link between 
fake news and either confused decision-making in the voting process or 
harm to democratic self-governance in terms of the outcome of an 
election changing. 
Proving a direct causal link, especially in the intangible realm of 
decision-making, is extremely difficult.  Many factors may influence a 
voter’s state of mind and, ultimately, his or her voting decision.  In brief, 
teasing apart and separating variables that may lead to the decision of 
how to vote is an exceedingly complex process.89   
For instance, a person who voted for Donald Trump might have read 
and actually believed a fake news story relating to Trump or Hillary 
Clinton, but the vote for Trump may have been based on a myriad of 
additional variables.  These variables might include a personal dislike of 
Clinton, a disagreement with her positions on substantive issues, or a 
 
 83. Id. at 26. 
 84. Brown, 564 U.S. at 799. 
 85. Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000)). 
 86. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000) (opining that “the 
Government must present more than anecdote and supposition”). 
 87. Brown, 564 U.S. at 799-800. 
 88. See Cecilia Kang & Adam Goldman, Fake News Brought Real Guns in Washington Pizzeria 
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2016, at A1 (describing an incident in which a man who had been reading 
“fake news articles about Comet Ping Pong” supposedly “harboring young children as sex slaves as part 
of a child-abuse ring led by Hillary Clinton” went to the restaurant “to see the situation for himself” and, 
in turn, “fired from an assault-like AR-15 rifle”). 
 89. See Blair Lehman et al., Confusion and Complex Learning During Interactions With 
Computer Learning Environments, 15 INTERNET & HIGHER EDUC. 184, 184 (2012) (concluding that 
“complex learning occurs when learners work towards comprehending difficult material, solve a 
difficult problem, or make a difficult decision,” such as voting decisions, and contending that during 
complex learning “there is a natural ebb and flow between positive and negative emotions, coinciding 
with the struggles and successes that learners experience during effortful problems solving, reasoning 
and comprehension”). 
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disdain for all Democratic politicians.  Conversely, other variables may 
include a personal fondness of Trump, an agreement with his positions 
on substantive issues, a loyalty to the Republican party,90 and so forth.   
Now consider the impact of real news relevant to the 2016 
presidential election.  For instance, the decision of James Comey, the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation – just eleven days before 
the election – to reinvestigate Clinton’s private email server may have 
caused people to vote for Trump.91  Indeed, the New York Times 
reported that Clinton directly “cast blame for her surprise election loss” 
on Comey’s announcement.92  Alternatively, some Democrats attribute 
the outcome of the election to computer hacking by Russia and the 
subsequent release of emails from the Democratic National Committee 
and from Clinton’s campaign chair.93   
Imagine having to pick one variable – fake news, Comey, or Russia – 
and then attempting to control for the other two, as well as controlling 
for typically influential factors such as party identification, gender, 
substantive issues, and interpersonal networks, to determine why people 
voted the way they did.  It is not easily said and even less easily done. 
In a nutshell, it is far simpler to hurl verbal blame for why people 
vote the way they do than to empirically prove what actually causes 
them to do so.  Direct causation is what strict scrutiny demands per 
Brown and Alvarez.  Fake news – although perhaps believed – does not 
necessarily lead to either a changed or confused voting decision.  
Dozens of other bits of information and factors swirl frenetically in any 
election season that may cause a citizen to choose to vote for a particular 
candidate.94 
Similarly, voters can be confused by many things other than and in 
addition to fake news in deciding for whom to vote.  They may be 
influenced and befuddled by numerous outside factors, including the 
 
 90. See generally Gregory L. Hager & Jeffery C. Talbert, Look for the Party Label: Party 
Influences on Voting in the U. S. House, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 75, 94 (2000) (“Our results suggest that 
parties do influence member behavior beyond that predicted from their individual preference 
structure.”).   
 91. See Michael S. Schmidt & Adam Goldman, President is Said to Ask Comey to Keep F.B.I. 
Post, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2017, at A15 (“Mrs. Clinton and many Democrats blame Mr. Comey for her 
defeat, and it is not clear whether she would have kept him on had she won.”). 
 92. Amy Chozick, Clinton Blames F.B.I. Director for Her Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2016, at 
A1. 
 93. See Michael D. Shear & David E. Sanger, Putin Led Scheme to Aid Trump, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
7, 2017, at A1 (providing an overview of a report prepared by several U.S. intelligence agencies 
regarding Russian hacking intended to influence the presidential election in Trump’s favor). 
 94. See Benjamin I. Page & Calvin C. Jones, Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party 
Loyalties and the Vote, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1071, 1087 (1973) (asserting that “researchers who rely 
on single-equation techniques simply fail to reproduce faithfully the underlying complexity of the 
electoral decision process”) (emphasis added). 
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views of neighbors, friends, and relatives during interpersonal 
conversations, the views of radio talk show hosts and television 
personalities, advertisements for candidates on television, biased 
reporting (which is not the same as fake news defined in this Article), 
and conspiracy theories. 
In addition to a dearth of empirical research proving that banning fake 
news would promote the government’s dual interests, a recent study 
indicates fake news may have had, if anything, a de minimis effect on 
the 2016 presidential election.95  Economists from New York University 
and Stanford found that fake news likely did not sway the U.S. 
presidential election, despite the fact that it only needed to change the 
votes of 0.73% of the voting-age population to do so.96  According to 
the researchers, 
 
data suggest that social media were not the most important source 
of election news, and even the most widely circulated fake news 
stories were seen by only a small fraction of Americans.  For fake 
news to have changed the outcome of the election, a single fake 
news story would need to have convinced about 0.7 percent of 
Clinton voters and non-voters who saw it to shift their votes to 
Trump, a persuasion rate equivalent to seeing 36 television 
campaign ads.97  
 
Furthermore, a December 2016 Pew Research Center survey found an 
overwhelming majority of Americans expressed confidence in their 
ability to detect fake news, with about four out of ten (39%) feeling very 
confident they could recognize fabricated news and another 45% being 
somewhat confident.98  In other words, 84% of those surveyed were 
either somewhat or very confident they would not be fooled by fake 
news.  This too suggests fake news is not “an actual problem.”99 
Moreover, scant data exist on any aspect of fake news, much less 
whether it causes voters to change their ballots.  A January 2017 
analysis in Columbia Journalism Review posits that “[w]e know little 
about the amount of fake news an average citizen consumes, or how it 
fits into their overall news diet.  In fact, we don’t know much about the 
 
 95. Working Paper No. 23089, Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake 
News in the 2016 Election, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. (Jan. 2017) (on file with author). 
 96. Id. at 20. 
 97. Id. at 22. 
 98. Michael Barthel et al., Many Americans Believe Fake News is Sowing Confusion, PEW RES. 
CTR., Dec. 15, 2016, http://www.journalism.org/2016/12/15/many-americans-believe-fake-news-is-
sowing-confusion. 
 99. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000). 
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fake news audience, period.”100  The same analysis suggests that fake 
news might not be a problem at all.  Why?  First, it found “the fake news 
audience is tiny compared to the real news audience – about ten times 
smaller on average.”101  Second, the study underscores “the fact that the 
fake news audience is small and highly likely to also visit real news sites 
may come as a relief to those who fear this audience lives in a separate, 
distorted reality.”102 
Ultimately, it is much easier to claim that fake news influences voters 
than it is, under strict scrutiny, to prove a direct causal link between fake 
news and the harm it causes either to individual voting decisions or to 
overall election outcomes.  Thus, the government would find it 
extraordinarily challenging to prove that the two interests were 
compelling enough to justify a hypothetical law criminalizing the 
knowing creation and dissemination of fake news about matters of 
public concern.   
As Justice Anthony Kennedy explained in announcing the Court’s 
judgment in Alvarez, “[t]here must be a direct causal link between the 
restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”103  There is, 
however, no direct causal evidence revealing that fake news prompts 
individuals to vote differently than they would have without fake news 
or that fake news causes overall election outcomes to change.  Put more 
bluntly, no evidence demonstrates fake news is “an actual problem”104 
when it comes to voters’ decisions.   
More so, even if one could prove that some voters did in fact change 
their decisions due to fake news, it would not justify government 
regulation if the real-world effect was “small and indistinguishable from 
effects produced by other media.”105  In other words, the government 
would need to somehow demonstrate that the effect of fake news in 
influencing voter decisions was larger than, and distinguishable from, 
the impact of innumerable messages affecting voter decisions.  
Assuming for the sake of argument that a direct causal link between 
fake news and voting decisions was demonstrated and that the impact 
carried practical significance, this still would not end the strict scrutiny 
inquiry.  Specifically, the second prong of the test requires that a statute 
be narrowly tailored.  
 
 100. Jacob L. Nelson, Is ‘Fake News’ a Fake Problem?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan. 31, 
2017, https://www.cjr.org/analysis/fake-news-facebook-audience-drudge-breitbart-study.php.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
 103. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012). 
 104. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 822. 
 105. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 800-01 (2011).  
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As defined in 2014 by the majority in McCullen v. Coakley,106 strict 
scrutiny’s narrow-tailoring prong mandates that lawmakers use “the 
least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.”107  Put 
differently, a content-based law will not pass constitutional muster if a 
compelling interest “can be accomplished by a less restrictive 
alternative.”108  In fact, as the Court noted, “[w]hen a plausible, less 
restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech restriction, it 
is the Government’s obligation to prove that the alternative will be 
ineffective to achieve its goals.”109  The burden thus shifts to the 
government to refute the effectiveness of a plausible, less restrictive 
method of serving a compelling interest. 
As applied to this Article’s hypothetical statute, the government 
would need to prove the inefficacy of at least three plausible, less 
speech-restrictive ways of preventing people from being confused by 
fake news such that they vote differently because of it.  Those three 
alternatives are: (1) counterspeech, (2) education, and (3) self-
regulation. 
The doctrine of counterspeech is grounded in Justice Louis 
Brandeis’s observation ninety years ago that “if there be time to expose 
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the 
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not 
enforced silence.”110  The doctrine’s premise is “that ‘bad speech’ can 
be effectively countered or cured with more speech.”111 
Dean Rodney Smolla points out that Justice Kennedy’s plurality 
opinion in Alvarez “emphasized the importance of counterspeech in the 
balance, and the requirement that the government show that 
counterspeech will not work to vindicate its interests.”112  Professor 
Howard Wasserman concurs, noting that Kennedy’s strict scrutiny 
analysis emphasized that “any confusion from false statements could be 
overcome by truthful counterspeech as the remedy for false speech.”113 
This is particularly significant because Alvarez – in line with the 
hypothetical statute’s definition of fake news114 – involved a material, 
 
 106. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
 107. Id. at 2530 (emphasis added). 
 108. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 814. 
 109. Id. at 816. 
 110. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 111. Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old Remedy for 
“Bad” Speech, 2000 BYU L. REV. 553, 554 (2000). 
 112. Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free Speech 
Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 499, 
515 (2012). 
 113. Howard M. Wasserman, Holmes and Brennan, 67 ALA. L. REV. 797, 824 (2016). 
 114. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (providing the hypothetical statute’s definition 
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factual assertion that was empirically verifiable as false.  Specifically, 
Xavier Alvarez falsely claimed to possess the Congressional Medal of 
Honor.115  He was, in turn, “indicted under the Stolen Valor Act for 
lying about the Congressional Medal of Honor.”116 
In declaring the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional under what he 
called “exacting First Amendment scrutiny,”117 Kennedy concluded that 
“[t]he Government has not shown, and cannot show, why counterspeech 
would not suffice to achieve its interest.  The facts of this case indicate 
that the dynamics of free speech, of counterspeech, of refutation, can 
overcome the lie.”118  With concision and eloquence, Kennedy explained 
that “the remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.  This is the 
ordinary course in a free society.  The response to the unreasoned is the 
rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the 
simple truth.”119  Intimating that the government simply has no role to 
play as truth arbiter, Kennedy added that “only a weak society needs 
government protection or intervention before it pursues its resolve to 
preserve the truth.  Truth needs neither handcuffs nor a badge for its 
vindication.”120 
As applied to fake news, counterspeech easily takes the form of non-
governmental fact-checking organizations and mainstream news media 
outlets that investigate and, in turn, rebut fake news spewed by others.121  
The Poynter Institute for Media Studies, for example, coordinates the 
International Fact-Checking Network.122  Websites such as Snopes123 
and PolitiFact124 are devoted to rigorous verification of facts.  These 
sites, in other words, are themselves counterspeech ventures. 
They also represent the type of counterspeech Justice Kennedy valued 
and praised in Alvarez.  There, he pointed out that “private individuals 
have already created databases”125 listing the names of actual 
 
of fake news). 
 115. United States v. Alvarez, 132 U.S. 2537, 2542 (2012). 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 2546.  
 118. Id. at 2549.  
 119. Id. at 2550. 
 120. Id. at 2550-51. 
 121. See LUCAS GRAVES, DECIDING WHAT’S TRUE: THE RISE OF POLITICAL FACT-CHECKING IN 
AMERICAN JOURNALISM (2016) (providing an up-to-date account on fact-checking journalism); Brendan 
Nyhan & Jason Reifler, The Effect of Fact-Checking on Elites: A Field Experiment on U.S. State 
Legislators, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 628 (2015) (studying the effects of fact-checking on deterring 
politicians from making questionable statements and assertions). 
 122. About the International Fact-Checking Network, http://www.poynter.org/about-the-
international-fact-checking-network.   
 123. Snopes, http://www.snopes.com. 
 124. PolitiFact, http://www.politifact.com. 
 125. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012). 
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Congressional Medal of Honor recipients and that “at least one database 
of past winners is online and fully searchable,”126 thus countering 
fabulists such as Xavier Alvarez.  Kennedy even suggested the 
government could create such a database that would constitute “one less 
speech-restrictive means by which the Government could likely protect 
the integrity of the military awards system.”127 
In addition to counterspeech, a second plausible and less restrictive 
remedy for fake news is education.  For example, in terms of educating 
the public about fake news, the Washington Post offers readers a guide 
for how to detect it.128  National Public Radio provides a similar online 
resource.129   
Perhaps more importantly, state and local governments can adopt 
improved media literacy programs in public schools.  In fact, California 
lawmakers introduced legislation in January 2017130 designed to do 
exactly that in light of fake-news fears.131  Assembly Bill 155 calls on 
the California’s Instructional Quality Commission to generate “revised 
curriculum standards and frameworks for English language arts, 
mathematics, history-social science, and science that incorporate civic 
online reasoning.”132  The bill defines “civic online reasoning” as “the 
ability to judge the credibility and quality of information found on 
Internet Web sites, including social media.”133  The bill’s sponsor, 
Assemblyman Jimmy Gomez, argues it is needed because “[w]hen fake 
news is repeated, it becomes difficult for the public to discern what’s 
real.  These attempts to mislead readers pose a direct threat to our 
democracy.”134 
In addition to counterspeech and education, a third plausible and less 
speech-restrictive remedy for fake news is voluntary self-regulation by 
 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Glenn Kessler, The Fact Checker’s Guide for Detecting Fake News, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 
2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/11/22/the-fact-checkers-guide-for-
detecting-fake-news/?utm_term=.c21972a0261c. 
 129. Wynne Davis, Fake or Real? How to Self-Check the News and Get the Facts, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO, Dec. 5, 2016, http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/12/05/503581220/fake-or-
real-how-to-self-check-the-news-and-get-the-facts. 
 130. A.B. 155, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 131. See Lindsey Bever, If State Lawmakers Have Their Way, California Schoolchildren May be 
Taught How to Spot ‘Fake News,’ WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/12/if-state-lawmakers-have-their-way-
california-schoolchildren-may-be-taught-how-to-spot-fake-news (describing the legislation). 
 132. A.B. 155, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (emphasis added). 
 133. Id.  
 134. Melanie Mason, Fake News 101? Lawmakers Want California Schools to Teach Students 
How to Evaluate What They Read on the Web, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2017, 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-los-angeles-assemblyman-
proposes-bill-1484182108-htmlstory.html.  
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private entities.  Some of these approaches already are underway to 
tackle fake news frets.  For instance, the New York Times reported in 
December 2016 that Facebook was conducting 
 
a series of experiments to limit misinformation on its site.  The 
tests include making it easier for its 1.8 billion members to report 
fake news, and creating partnerships with outside fact-checking 
organizations to help it indicate when articles are false.  The 
company is also changing some advertising practices to stop 
purveyors of fake news from profiting from it.135 
 
In a similar vein, Justice Scalia in Brown lauded the Entertainment 
Software Rating Board’s (ESRB) self-regulatory system for evaluating 
video games’ suitability for minors as a prime example of a less 
restrictive method for addressing a supposed problem.136  “This system 
does much to ensure that minors cannot purchase seriously violent 
games on their own, and that parents who care about the matter can 
readily evaluate the games their children bring home,” Scalia 
reasoned.137  In other words, the ESRB’s ratings combine aspects of 
both education and self-regulation. 
Ultimately, it is decidedly unlikely that a statute criminalizing the 
knowing creation and dissemination of fake news, as defined in this 
Article,138 would ever survive strict scrutiny.  Even if a compelling 
interest were substantiated in the face of the demanding direct causal 
link standard, there are multiple means of combatting fake news that are 
far less restrictive of speech than criminalizing it.  With this assessment 
in mind, the Article next turns to an underinclusivity analysis of the 
hypothetical statute. 
B. Underinclusiveness  
Can a statute do too little to cure problems allegedly caused by speech 
and thus be struck down for failing to advance a compelling interest?  
The answer is yes – sometimes – and the doctrine involved is 
underinclusivity.139  Although Chief Justice John Roberts recently wrote 
 
 135. Mike Isaac, Facebook Moves to Limit Tide of Fake News on Its Network, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
16, 2016, at B1.  See also Jessica Guynn, Facebook Takes Serious Aim at Fake News, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 16, 2016, at B1 (reporting that “[n]ews articles flagged by [Facebook] users will be sent to third-
party fact-checking organizations that are part of Poynter’s International Fact Checking Network”). 
 136. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 803 (2011). 
 137. Id.  
 138. See supra notes 30-33 (providing the hypothetical statute’s definition of fake news). 
 139. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668 (2015) (asserting that while it is 
“somewhat counterintuitive to argue that a law violates the First Amendment by abridging too little 
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that “the First Amendment imposes no freestanding ‘underinclusiveness 
limitation,’”140 Professor Mark Cordes dubs underinclusivity “an area of 
frequent concern for the Supreme Court.”141 
Indeed, Professor Matthew Bunker observes that the Court’s 
underinclusivity standard is integral to strict scrutiny’s narrow-tailoring 
inquiry.142  Bunker suggests this initially seems counterintuitive,143 as 
narrow tailoring examines whether a law uses the least restrictive means 
of achieving a compelling interest,144 while underinclusivity conversely 
considers if a statute is “not broad enough.”145  In brief, lawmakers tread 
a tightrope: a statute cannot regulate too much speech per narrow 
tailoring, yet it also cannot regulate too little speech per 
underinclusivity. 
In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,146 Chief Justice Roberts explained 
that a statute’s “[u]nderinclusivity creates a First Amendment concern 
when the State regulates one aspect of a problem while declining to 
regulate a different aspect of the problem that affects its stated interest in 
a comparable way.”147  Put differently by Harvard Professor Richard 
Fallon, underinclusivity holds that “[a] statute will not survive strict 
scrutiny if it fails to regulate activities that pose substantially the same 
threats to the government’s purportedly compelling interest as the 
conduct that the government prohibits.”148 
In Williams-Yulee, Roberts explained that underinclusivity may 
indicate two problems.149  First, the government may be unjustly 
promoting one viewpoint over another, instead of addressing a broader 
interest.150  Second, a regulation riddled with multiple exemptions and 
loopholes may fail to advance a compelling interest.151  Federal 
appellate court judge Harry Edwards encapsulated these dual concerns 
 
speech,” a statute’s underinclusiveness can “reveal that a law does not actually advance a compelling 
interest.  For example, a State’s decision to prohibit newspapers, but not electronic media, from 
releasing the names of juvenile defendants suggested that the law did not advance its stated purpose of 
protecting youth privacy”) (emphasis in original). 
 140. Id. (quoting R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 387 (1992)). 
 141. Mark Cordes, Sign Regulation After Ladue: Examining the Evolving Limits of First 
Amendment Protection, 74 NEB. L. REV. 36, 69 (1995). 
 142. Matthew D. Bunker & Emily Erickson, The Jurisprudence of Precision: Contrast Space and 
Narrow Tailoring in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 259, 264 n.16 (2001). 
 143. Id.  
 144. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014).  See supra notes 106-109 and 
accompanying text (addressing the meaning of narrow tailoring within strict scrutiny). 
 145. Bunker & Erickson, supra note 142, at 264 n.16.  
 146. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
 147. Id. at 1670 (emphasis omitted). 
 148. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1327 (2007). 
 149. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668-69. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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in a 1995 article, remarking that courts 
 
frequently employ an underinclusiveness inquiry to determine 
whether a given regulation satisfactorily serves the interest that the 
state purports to advance.  If a speech restriction leaves 
unregulated significant alternative sources of the harm sought to be 
remedied, a court will reason that the underinclusiveness either 
belies the state’s avowed objective, or establishes that, in practice, 
the regulation will not adequately serve the state’s putatively 
compelling interest.152  
 
Consider the scenario in City of Ladue v. Gilleo:153  the Supreme 
Court struck down an ordinance banning homeowners from displaying 
signs on their property while simultaneously exempting ten other 
varieties of signs from its strictures.154  The Court reasoned that the 
numerous exemptions indicated Ladue was not truly worried about its 
three alleged interests155 – preserving beauty, maintaining property 
values, and mitigating traffic hazards.156  The outcome in Gilleo 
confirms Professor William Lee’s perspicacious observation that, per 
the underinclusivity doctrine, “what a law excludes is a critical part of 
determining whether a law is precisely tailored.”157 
Two newer Supreme Court decisions illustrate that regulating too 
little speech may render a statute fatally underinclusive.  In 2015, the 
Court in Reed v. Town of Gilbert158 held that a sign ordinance was 
“hopelessly underinclusive”159 in serving alleged interests in “preserving 
the Town’s aesthetic appeal and traffic safety.”160  Specifically, the 
Town of Gilbert’s ordinance generally banned outdoor signs within its 
 
 152. Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1487, 1530-31 (1995) (citations omitted). 
 153. 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
 154. See id. at 46 (“The ordinance prohibits all signs except those that fall within 1 of 10 
exemptions.”).  
 155. See id. at 52 (“Exemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation of a medium of speech 
may be noteworthy for a reason quite apart from the risks of viewpoint and content discrimination: They 
may diminish the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting speech in the first place.”).   
 156. See id. at 47 (noting that Ladue, in the ordinance’s declaration of findings, was concerned 
that an unlimited number of signs would “create ugliness, visual blight and clutter, tarnish the natural 
beauty of the landscape as well as the residential and commercial architecture, impair property values, 
substantially impinge upon the privacy and special ambience of the community, and may cause safety 
and traffic hazards to motorists, pedestrians, and children”). 
 157. William E. Lee, The First Amendment Doctrine of Underbreadth, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 
68788 (1993) (emphasis added). 
 158. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 159. Id. at 2231. 
 160. Id.  
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town limits but carved out a whopping twenty-three exemptions.161   
As for the town’s aesthetics rationale, Justice Clarence Thomas 
explained for the Court that the Town of Gilbert “cannot claim that 
placing strict limits on temporary directional signs is necessary to 
beautify the Town while at the same time allowing unlimited numbers 
of other types of signs that create the same problem.”162  Turning to the 
municipality’s safety interest, Thomas opined that the Town of Gilbert 
failed to demonstrate 
 
that limiting temporary directional signs is necessary to eliminate 
threats to traffic safety, but that limiting other types of signs is not.  
The Town has offered no reason to believe that directional signs 
pose a greater threat to safety than do ideological or political signs.  
If anything, a sharply worded ideological sign seems more likely to 
distract a driver than a sign directing the public to a nearby church 
meeting.163 
 
In its 2011 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association 
decision,164 the Court held that a California statute banning minors from 
renting and purchasing violent video games was profoundly 
underinclusive in two respects.  First, citing Gilleo for support,165 Justice 
Antonin Scalia explained for the majority that California failed “to 
restrict Saturday morning cartoons, the sale of games rated for young 
children, or the distribution of pictures of guns.  The consequence is that 
its regulation is wildly underinclusive when judged against its asserted 
justification, which in our view is alone enough to defeat it.”166  Second, 
California’s statute carved out an exemption allowing parents and 
guardians to purchase violent games on behalf of minors.167  Here, 
Scalia reasoned: 
 
The California Legislature is perfectly willing to leave this 
dangerous, mind-altering material in the hands of children so long 
as one parent (or even an aunt or uncle) says it’s OK.  And there 
are not even any requirements as to how this parental or avuncular 
relationship is to be verified; apparently the child’s or putative 
parent’s, aunt’s, or uncle’s say-so suffices.  That is not how one 
 
 161. Id. at 2224. 
 162. Id. at 2231. 
 163. Id. at 2232. 
 164. 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 165. Id. at 802 
 166. Id. at 801-02 (emphasis added). 
 167. Id. at 802. 
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addresses a serious social problem.168 
 
Taking into account the above primer on underinclusivity, a critical 
issue is whether this Article’s hypothetical statute banning the knowing 
creation and dissemination of fake news about matters of public concern 
is terminally underinclusive.  Initially, it is important to recall that the 
statute’s two asserted interests are “preventing confused decision-
making in voting choices and safeguarding democratic self-governance 
during the voting process.”169  Fake news, in turn, is defined as “articles 
that suggest, by both their appearance and content, the conveyance of 
real news, but also knowingly include at least one material factual 
assertion that is empirically verifiable as false and that is not otherwise 
protected by the fair report privilege.”170     
The primary underinclusiveness problem here is that many 
unregulated types of speech – some varieties were described earlier171 – 
may cause confusion and detrimentally affect voting choices in ways 
substantially comparable to that of fake news.172  For example, consider 
rhetorical hyperbole173 directly spewed by politicians during speeches, 
rallies, debates, and press conferences.  Such potentially influential yet 
logically cloudy expression is left unscathed by the hypothetical statute, 
which applies only to articles appearing to be real news.   
Additionally, biased and opinionated journalistic coverage of 
campaigns and candidates – although not factually false – could result in 
voter confusion.  It too goes untouched by the statute, which defines 
fake news as involving a material and false factual assertion.174  In other 
words, journalistic expressions of opinion and slanted coverage may 
confuse voters equally as much as verifiably false factual assertions, yet 
the former falls beyond the ambit of the hypothetical statute. 
 
 168. Id. 
 
 169. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (quoting this portion of the text that appears earlier 
in this article that corresponds with footnote 44). 
 170. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (quoting this portion of the text that appears 
earlier in this article that corresponds with footnotes 30 through 33). 
 171. Supra Part I, Section A. 
 172. The question of comparability of impact is important, as Chief Justice Roberts wrote in 
Williams-Yulee that “[u]nderinclusivity creates a First Amendment concern when the State regulates one 
aspect of a problem while declining to regulate a different aspect of the problem that affects its stated 
interest in a comparable way.”  Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1670 (2015) (emphasis in 
original). 
 173. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (safeguarding from libel suits 
“rhetorical hyperbole,” and noting that such speech “has traditionally added much to the discourse of 
our Nation”). 
 174. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (providing the hypothetical statute’s definition 
of fake news”). 
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Furthermore, consider a popular televangelist who instructs tens of 
thousands of faithful followers during weekly TV sermons and during 
daily posts on Twitter not to vote for Candidate X because, according to 
the televangelist, Candidate X wants to confiscate their guns in 
contravention of the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.175  
The statute does not restrict the televangelist’s speech, even if the 
assertions are false, because the statute addresses only “articles that 
suggest, by both their appearance and content, the conveyance of real 
news.”176  The televangelist’s statements are communicated in sermons 
and Twitter posts, not in articles purporting to be real news. 
Additionally, imagine that while speaking on the senate floor, a 
lawmaker falsely accuses another senator of having an extramarital 
affair – a charge streamed live on C-SPAN.  This too goes unchecked 
because the statute only reaches news articles.177  Moreover, even if a 
journalist accurately reports the senator’s false allegations in a later 
news article, neither the journalist nor the news outlet can be punished 
because the statute’s definition of fake news exempts falsities that would 
otherwise be shielded from libel suits under the fair report privilege.178  
Thus, while the accusations levied by both the televangelist and the 
senator are statements that can be empirically proven as false, they 
evade the hypothetical statute’s reach and thus float free to confuse, 
bother, and bewilder voters.179 
Ultimately, whenever and wherever confusion affects balloting, it is 
likely the consequence of many unregulated variables – ones 
comparable to, if not more powerful than, fake news in spawning 
confusion.  Furthermore, and perhaps of even greater significance, there 
 
 175. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”).  The Second 
Amendment has been incorporated by the Supreme Court to apply to state and local government entities 
and officials through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.  See McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (holding “that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Second Amendment right” as recognized by the Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008), and specifying that “[i]n Heller, we held that the Second Amendment protects the 
right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense”). 
 176. Supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
 177. Supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing this exemption from the statute’s 
definition of fake news and the rationale for carving out the exemption); see also KENT R. MIDDLETON 
& WILLIAM E. LEE, THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 158 (9th ed. 2014) (“A qualified privilege 
protects journalists who report defamatory comments made in official proceedings as long as the stories 
are fair and accurate.”); ROBERT TRAGER ET AL., THE LAW OF JOURNALISM AND MASS 
COMMUNICATION 197 (6th ed. 2018) (noting that to fit within this privilege, “[t]he news report must 
fairly and accurately reflect what is in the public record or what was said during the official 
proceeding,” and adding that “[t]he source of the statement should be clearly noted in the news report”). 
 179. Cf. FRANK SINATRA, Bewitched, on NOTHING BUT THE BEST (Reprise Records 2008) 
(singing, in just one of many cover versions of the song over the decades, “I’m wild again, beguiled 
again, a whimpering, simpering child again, bewitched, bothered and bewildered – am I”). 
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are far vaster and more challenging social and cultural phenomena – 
systemic variables at a macro level – that likely contribute to voter 
confusion, but go unchecked by the statute.  These include (1) a lack of 
digital media literacy, news literacy and rudimentary civic education 
among some people; (2) the replacement of traditional news sources – 
ones that typically follow ethical tenets of responsible journalism180 – 
with information delivered via social media platforms that fail to adhere 
to such standards; and (3) the inability or unwillingness of politicians to 
truthfully communicate with their constituents.   
As a result, censorship of fake news, as defined in this article, fails to 
make a dent or dimple on much larger problems of “preventing confused 
decision-making in voting choices and safeguarding democratic self-
governance during the voting process.”181  This Article’s hypothetical 
statute thus would almost certainly be declared unconstitutional for its 
underinclusivity.  It simply does too little, failing to directly and 
materially advance its dual interests.   
With this doctrinal analysis of both strict scrutiny and 
underinclusiveness complete, the Article now addresses two venerable 
theories of free speech to consider if they would safeguard fake news 
from government censorship.  
II. A FREE SPEECH THEORY PERSPECTIVE ON CENSORING FAKE NEWS: 
WHY THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS AND DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNANCE  
THEORIES FAIL TO PROTECT FAKE NEWS FROM CENSORSHIP 
This Part has two sections.  Initially, Section A analyzes support – or 
lack thereof – for protecting fake news against government censorship 
under the marketplace of ideas theory.  Section B then considers the 
same issue, but from the perspective of Alexander Meiklejohn’s theory 
of democratic self-governance. 
A. The Marketplace of Ideas 
First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla crowns the marketplace of 
ideas as “perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech 
tradition.”182  Similarly, Professor Matthew Bunker dubs it “one of the 
most powerful images of free speech, both for legal thinkers and for 
 
 180. Cf. AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI 
THREATEN A FREE PRESS 2 (2015) (asserting that courts traditionally granted mainstream news 
organizations deference under the First Amendment based on an assumption “that journalists could be 
trusted to regulate themselves through professional norms and standards”). 
 181. Supra note 44. 
 182. SMOLLA, supra note 3 at 6.  
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laypersons.”183   
Indeed, a content analysis of opinions published twenty-one years ago 
reveals that the marketplace of ideas is “the model most called upon by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in the resolution of free-expression cases.”184  
Today, it remains often invoked by the Court.185 
The foundational premises of this highly influential, albeit often 
criticized,186 theory are twofold.  The first is that protecting open, 
uninhibited exchanges of ideas promotes truth discovery.187  The second 
premise is that even if absolute truth is never established or agreed 
upon,188 the process itself – the testing and confronting of contemporary 
conceptions of truth – must be privileged.189  In brief, the marketplace 
theory is as much about process (challenging ideas) as it is about 
 
 183. MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND 
THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 2 (2001). 
 184. W. Wat Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 JOURNALISM & 
MASS COMM. Q. 40, 47 (1996).  
 185. See, e.g., Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245-46 
(2015) (asserting that “government statements (and government actions and programs that take the form 
of speech) do not normally trigger the First Amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of 
ideas”); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) (conceding 
“that, whenever government disfavors one kind of speech, it places that speech at a disadvantage, 
potentially interfering with the free marketplace of ideas”); McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 
(2014) (“In light of the First Amendment’s purpose ‘to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in 
which truth will ultimately prevail,’ . . . this aspect of traditional public fora is a virtue, not a vice.”) 
(quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)); Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310, 335 (2010) (asserting that when Federal Election Commission advisory opinions “prohibit 
speech, ‘[m]any persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of 
vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected 
speech – harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas.’”) (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)). 
 186. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 831 
(2008) (“For all of its power, the marketplace of ideas metaphor also has explanatory weaknesses and 
normative difficulties, almost all of which track the shortcomings of its idealized view of an uninhibited, 
costless, and perfectly efficient free market.”); Lyrissa Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience 
as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 799, 826 (2010) (“According to critics, the 
marketplace of ideas cannot function because a few powerful voices drown out all others.  The resulting 
lack of diversity in public discourse deprives citizens of the information they need to make rational 
decisions and denies them their right to participate in policy formation.”).  
 187. See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against 
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003) (“The marketplace of ideas locates the value of free speech in 
finding the truth, and it makes the market the arbiter of truth or falsity.”).  
 188. Indeed, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. who, as described later, is most closely associated 
with the marketplace of ideas theory in First Amendment jurisprudence, “displayed an instinctive 
aversion to assertions of ‘absolute’ truth.” Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 14 (2004). 
 189. See Enrique Armijo, The “Ample Alternative Channels” Flaw in First Amendment Doctrine, 
73 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1657, 1696-98 (2016) (noting that “[m]arketplace theory defines the First 
Amendment’s primary function as facilitating a process by which truth can be reached,” and adding that 
“[a] process-based definition of marketplace theory predominates in First Amendment scholarship”) 
(emphasis added). 
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product (the truth). 
As this Article’s epigraph reveals, the marketplace of ideas model, 
with its quest-for-truth telos,190 originates in John Milton’s 1644 
Areopagitica.191  John Stuart Mill then elaborated on the marketplace of 
ideas model over 200 years later in On Liberty.192  As Professor Kent 
Greenawalt explains, the contention “that speech promotes the discovery 
of truth”193 forms “the core of John Stuart Mill’s defense of freedom of 
speech in On Liberty.”194 
Importantly for this Article, Mill emphasized protecting opinions, not 
empirically disprovable falsehoods.  Specifically, On Liberty’s chapter 
“Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion” is devoted to what Mill 
termed “the subject of freedom of opinion.”195  He directed his analysis 
against “the mischief of denying a hearing to opinions.”196  Perhaps 
more famously, Mill asserted that 
 
the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it 
is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing 
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than 
those who hold it.  If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what 
is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.197 
 
As summarized by Professor Frederick Schauer, “Mill focuses our 
attention on the possibility that truth may lie in the suppressed 
opinion.”198  In a nutshell, Mill’s ideal marketplace shunned the stifling 
of opinions, not factual falsehoods. 
Against this Millian philosophical backdrop, the marketplace theory 
was imported into First Amendment law by Justice Oliver Wendell 
 
 190. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 15 (1982) 
(“Milton’s Areopagitica, the earliest comprehensive defence of freedom of speech, is based substantially 
on the premise that the absence of government restrictions on publishing (particularly the absence of 
licensing) will enable society to locate truth and reject error.”). 
 191. Supra notes 1-2. 
 192. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859).  
See Nicholas A. Primrose, Has Society Become Tolerant of Further Infringement on First Amendment 
Rights?, 19 BARRY L. REV. 313, 333, n.132 (2013) (“The ‘marketplace of ideas’ was originally 
developed in the book On Liberty by John Stuart Mill.”). 
 193. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130 (1989). 
 194. Id.  
 195. MILL, supra note 191, at 116. 
 196. Id. at 83. 
 197. Id. at 76. 
 198. SCHAUER, supra note 189, at 24 (emphasis added). 
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Holmes, Jr.,199 nearly 100 years ago in Abrams v. United States.200  
Although Professor Vincent Blasi calls Holmes’ holding an “irreverent 
attitude toward the concept of truth,”201 the justice paved the path for the 
marketplace theory in Abrams, opining in dissent that 
 
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their 
wishes safely can be carried out.202 
 
Consistent with Mill’s emphasis on safeguarding opinions, Holmes’s 
above-quoted language focuses on protecting “ideas”203 and 
“thought[s],”204 not disprovable facts.  The impact of his message on 
First Amendment jurisprudence is profound.  As Professor Joseph 
Blocher notes, “[n]ever before or since has a Justice conceived a 
metaphor that has done so much to change the way that courts, lawyers, 
and the public understand an entire area of constitutional law.”205 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell206 embraced 
both the marketplace of ideas and its emphasis on protecting opinions, 
rather than false facts.  Delivering the Court’s decision, Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist explained that “[f]alse statements of fact are 
particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of 
the marketplace of ideas.”207  Indeed, this important fact-versus-opinion 
dichotomy builds from the Court’s 1974 observation in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc.208 that 
 
[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.  
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
 
 199. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 
(1984) (writing that although the marketplace of ideas’ “classic image of competing ideas and robust 
debate dates back to English philosophers John Milton and John Stuart Mill, Justice Holmes first 
introduced the concept into American jurisprudence in his 1919 dissent to Abrams v. United States”). 
 200. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 201. Blasi, supra note 187, at 15. 
 202. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id.  
 205. Blocher, supra note 185, at 824-825. 
 206. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 207. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
 208. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the 
competition of other ideas.  But there is no constitutional value in 
false statements of fact.209 
 
Similar, and consistent with this article’s narrow definition of 
proscribable fake news as limited to knowingly false factual 
statements,210 is the Supreme Court’s analysis in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.211  In Sullivan, the Court suggested that a well-functioning idea 
marketplace – one both embracing “the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”212 and “‘gathered 
out of a multitude of tongues’”213 – did not protect, per actual malice, a 
defamatory factual assertion published “with knowledge that it was 
false.”214  More recently, Justice Stephen Breyer reasoned in United 
States v. Alvarez215 that “false factual statements are less likely than are 
true factual statements to make a valuable contribution to the 
marketplace of ideas.”216 
Ultimately, while the marketplace theory certainly provides strong 
support for protecting opinions and arguments on topics involving 
“unprovable normative judgments,”217 such as political policies and 
social morality, it “provides a much weaker footing for protecting 
expression that can be readily disproved.”218  As Professor Steven Gey 
powerfully argued: 
 
If the determination of truth is the objective of the entire 
marketplace mechanism, there is no point in permitting the further 
dissemination of proven falsehoods. Indeed, disseminating 
falsehoods directly undermines the purpose of having a 
marketplace in the first place.  The only purpose of the 
marketplace of ideas is to advance human understanding about the 
nature of the world and the best way to live within it; it directly 
contravenes that purpose if the marketplace is used to keep human 
society mired in socially dysfunctional misunderstandings about 
 
 209. Id. at 339- – 40. 
 210. See supra notes 30 – 33 and accompanying text (providing the hypothetical statute’s 
definition of fake news in the text that corresponds to these footnotes). 
 211. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 212. Id. at 270. 
 213. Id. (quoting United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (D.C. S.D.N.Y. 1943)). 
 214. Id. at 280. 
 215. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 216. Id. at 2552 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 217. Gey, supra note 48, at 9.  
 218. Id. 
29
Calvert et al.: Fake News and the First Amendment: Reconciling a Disconnect Betwe
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications,
128 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
the nature of the world and its history.219 
 
In brief, the marketplace of ideas theory does not support protecting 
fake news, as defined in this article.  Disseminating fake news does not 
foster the type of rational debate or discussion220 that moves toward an 
ever closer truth or, in the words of First Amendment scholar Lee 
Bollinger, toward “as close an approximation of the truth as we can.”221  
If, as Yale Law School Dean Robert Post notes, “the search for truth 
presupposes rational deliberation,”222 then fake news must be driven 
from the marketplace simply because it conflicts, by its very nature, 
with rational deliberation.  William Williams explains this via an 
analogy: 
 
Deliberately false statements were never envisioned as a useful 
component of this marketplace.  They are analogous to counterfeit 
money in the physical marketplace: both equally worthless, yet 
both potentially very harmful.  In the same way that counterfeit 
money is properly excluded from the physical marketplace, so too 
is deliberately false speech properly excluded from the marketplace 
of ideas.223 
 
The bottom line is that marketplace theory does not support 
protecting fake news from government censorship.  Might the 
philosophy of democratic self-governance that is closely associated with 
Alexander Meiklejohn provide a better rationale for safeguarding it?  
The next section considers that question. 
B. Democratic Self-Governance 
As with the marketplace of ideas, democratic self-governance is a 
highly influential free speech theory.224  Robert Post, for example, 
 
 219. Id.  
 220. As Professor Frederick Schauer observes, a well-functioning marketplace of ideas is 
dependent on “rational thinking.”  SCHAUER, supra note 189, at 15. 
 221. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 45 (1986). 
 222. Robert C. Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 480 (1997). 
 223. William A. Williams, A Necessary Compromise: Protecting Electoral Integrity Through the 
Regulation of False Campaign Speech, 52 S.D. L. REV. 321, 350-51 (2007). 
 224. Eugene Volokh, Response: In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a 
Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 595, 595 (2011) (writing that “a broad vision of 
democratic self-government is one important justification for free speech”).  Although this article 
concentrates on the marketplace of ideas and democratic self-governance theories of free speech, there 
are numerous other rationales supporting free expression.  See Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273, 274 (1999) (“The freedoms of 
speech and press, for example, are said to promote and to protect discovery of truth, democratic self-
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deems it one of three “major candidates” – along with knowledge 
creation and individual autonomy – for best embodying key values 
safeguarded by the First Amendment.225  He adds that when it comes to 
judicial rulings affecting free expression, “the value of democratic self-
governance is the most powerful explanation of the general pattern of 
First Amendment decisions . . . and . . . the only value that can 
convincingly account for the specific set of decisions protecting the 
abusive, outrageous and indecent speech.”226   
Although the theory certainly is not without criticism,227 Post asserts 
that Alexander Meiklejohn228 provided “an especially clear revelation of 
the theory’s essential constitutional structure.”229  Indeed, Professor 
Richard Epstein dubs Meiklejohn “the father of modern First 
Amendment theory,”230 while Professor Steven Smith anoints him “a 
seminal modern free speech theorist.”231   
Professor Joseph Russomanno contends232 that such accolades are 
largely due to Meiklejohn’s powerful influence on Justice William 
Brennan’s opinion for the Supreme Court in the defamation case of New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.233  As Professor Lucas Powe puts it, the 
Court’s Sullivan decision “combined the insights of the philosopher 
 
governance, self-realization, dissent, tolerance, and honest government.”) (citations omitted). 
 225. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 478 (2011). 
 226. Robert C. Post, Reply to Bender, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 495, 495 (1997). 
 227. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1053, 1055-59 (2016) (offering three criticisms of Meiklejohn’s conception of democratic self-
governance theory); Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic 
Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 291 
(1991) (“The more important fallacy . . . is Meiklejohn’s failure to recognize the substantial differences 
between a town meeting and the realities of modern life.”); Martin H. Redish & Abbie Marie Mollen, 
Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the 
Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1303, 1313 (2009) (observing that some scholars “have 
questioned Meiklejohn’s analogy to the New England town meeting as a metaphor for what speech 
regulations the First Amendment does not prohibit,” while others have “suggested that Meiklejohn was 
blinded by a rather myopic understanding of the kinds of speech relevant to democratic 
decisionmaking”). 
 228. See Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public 
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1993) [hereinafter Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake] (asserting 
that “Meiklejohn anchors the First Amendment firmly to the value of self-government”). 
 229. Id.  
 230. Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 782 
(1986). 
 231. Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal Believings: The Neglected Center of the First 
Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 1233, 1250 (2002). 
 232. Joseph Russomanno, The “Central Meaning” and Path Dependence: The Madison-
Meiklejohn-Brennan Nexus, 20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 117, 117-18 (2015). 
 233. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  In Sullivan, the Court held that public officials who sue for libel based 
on speech relating to their official conduct must prove that the defamatory statement “was made with 
‘actual malice’ – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not.” Id. at 279-80. 
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Alexander Meiklejohn on the necessities of political speech with those 
of William Brennan, lawyer and jurist, on the practical effects of 
litigation.”234 
Given this theory’s importance in First Amendment law235 and 
Meiklejohn’s status as its “leading proponent,”236 a question logically 
arises: whether Meiklejohnian philosophy of democratic self-
governance would shield fake news – as defined and hypothetically 
criminalized in this Article237 – from government censorship.  As this 
section argues, the answer is a resounding no. 
This conclusion flows naturally from (1) the reasons why speech is 
protected under a Meiklejohnian perspective, and (2) the occasions 
when he believed it could rightfully be suppressed.  They are briefly 
described here.  
For Meiklejohn, as Columbia University President Lee Bollinger 
explains, “the principle of free speech plays a practical role for a self-
governing society, protecting discussion among citizens so that they can 
best decide what to do about the issues brought before them.”238  More 
simply phrased by Meiklejohn himself in Free Speech and Its Relation 
to Self-Government, speech is protected to facilitate “the voting of wise 
decisions.”239  He later elaborated in a law journal article that “[s]elf-
government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence . 
. . that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express.”240 
It is then, as Post writes, a “collectivist theory of the First 
Amendment”241 under which “the minds of the hearers”242 – the minds 
of voters, in other words – take precedence over speakers’ rights.243  
Using the metaphor of a town hall meeting to emphasize this point, 
Meiklejohn asserted that “[w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall 
 
 234. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS IN AMERICA 87 (1991). 
 235. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
521, 554 (1977) (“The most influential scholarly analysis of the First Amendment to be published since 
World War II is Professor Alexander Meiklejohn’s Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government.”). 
 236. BUNKER, supra note 182, at 8. 
 237. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (providing this article’s definition of fake 
news). 
 238. BOLLINGER, supra note 220, at 48. 
 239. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 45, at 25.  
 240. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255 
(1961). 
 241. Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note 227, at 1111.  See ROBERT C. POST, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 269 (1995) (“The most 
influential exposition of the collectivist theory of the First Amendment is by the American philosopher 
Alexander Meiklejohn; his work continues to inspire and guide the theory’s contemporary advocates.”).  
 242. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 45, at 25. 
 243. See id. (asserting that “in that method of political self-government, the point of ultimate 
interest is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers”).  
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speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.”244  Speech is 
protected at the meeting only as a means “to get business done”245 and, 
more specifically, to make voters “as wise as possible.”246  Such speech, 
in turn, must “be fully and fairly presented”247 as part of a “responsible 
and regulated discussion.”248   
Significantly, Meiklejohn seemingly provided no shelter to false 
factual statements.  As he wrote in 1961, referencing a storied aphorism 
penned by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Schenck v. United 
States,249 
 
a man is not allowed to shout “Fire!” falsely in a theater.  But, if, 
during a performance in a theater, a person sees a fire which 
threatens to spread, he is not only allowed, he is duty-bound, to try 
to find some way of informing others so that a panic may not ensue 
with its disastrous consequences.  The distinction between 
“falsely” and “truly” is here fundamental to an understanding of 
what freedom is.250  
 
As Meiklejohn ultimately concluded, “[i]t is the mutilation of the 
thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment 
to the Constitution is directed.”251  With this primer on Meiklejohnian 
theory in mind, it is readily apparent his theory would not protect fake 
news – as defined here252 – from government censorship. 
First and foremost, dissemination of fake news actually mutilates the 
thinking process of the community by permitting voters to consider 
information that is empirically verifiable as false.  If a key tenet of 
Meiklejohnian theory is that “the minds of the hearers”253 constitute “the 
point of ultimate interest”254 in political self-governance, then fake news 
must be jettisoned from the field of speech and from Meiklejohn’s 
metaphorical town-hall meeting due to its potential to confuse the minds 
of those who hear it.  Put more bluntly, propagation of fake news may 
lead to the voting of troublingly unwise decisions, in direct 
 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 23. 
 246. Id. at 25. 
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. at 23. 
 249. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).  Holmes opined that “[t]he most stringent protection of free speech 
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” Id. at 52. 
 250. Meiklejohn, supra note 239, at 261-262 (emphasis in original). 
 251. Meiklejohn, supra note 45, at 26.  
 252. Supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
 253. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 45, at 25. 
 254. Id.  
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contravention of Meiklejohn’s final goal. 
Second, Meiklejohn apparently would have no qualms or quibbles in 
censoring individuals who knowingly create and trade in fake news.  If, 
as Meiklejohn believed, it is not essential that everyone shall speak,255 
then censoring individuals whose speech is not worth saying is 
unproblematic.  Using Meiklejohn’s words, the purveyors and mongers 
of fake news are “out of order”256 when they deal in fake news. 
Third, Meiklejohn emphasized that all facts must “be fully and fairly 
presented”257 as part of “responsible and regulated discussion.”258  The 
knowing presentation to voters of empirically verifiable false facts on 
issues of public concern constitutes a decidedly unfair and irresponsible 
transmission of information.  In brief, fake news is unfair information, 
while those who knowingly convey it are irresponsible speakers.  
Regardless of whether a speaker transmits fake news to deliberately 
confuse an audience or to simply obtain an economic benefit via 
immense internet clicks, the bottom line is that such speech finds no 
shelter under Meiklejohnian theory.  Additionally, as Section A 
explained, the marketplace of ideas model would not safeguard fake 
news from government censorship.  Thus, two of the most important 
rationales for shielding speech from suppression fail to offer any 
resistance or opposition to a hypothetical statute criminalizing the 
knowing creation and dissemination of fake news.   
III. PROTECTING FAKE NEWS UNDER A STRUCTURAL RIGHTS APPROACH: 
RECONCILING DOCTRINE AND THEORY 
Part I argued that a law criminalizing the knowing creation and 
dissemination of fake news – a measure adopted in the interest of 
preventing voter confusion259 – almost inevitably would not pass 
constitutional muster.  Specifically, under the doctrines of strict scrutiny 
and underinclusivity, this Article’s hypothetical statute would surely be 
struck down.260  
Yet, as Part II explained, neither the marketplace of ideas nor 
democratic self-governance theories seemingly provide any shelter from 
censorship for fake news.  Because fake news, as defined in this 
 
 255. See id. (“What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying 
shall be said.”) (emphasis added). 
 256. Id. at 23.  
 257. Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 
 258. Id. at 23 (emphasis added). 
 259. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (identifying the interests underlying the 
hypothetical statute in this article). 
 260. Supra Part I. 
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Article,261 neither promotes truth discovery nor leads to wise voting, it 
ostensibly could be banished per these theories.262  
Such a disconnect between the First Amendment doctrine and theory 
is far from new.  Lamenting what he called “the sorry state of First 
Amendment doctrine,”263 Robert Post observed more than a dozen years 
ago that the “First Amendment doctrine veers between theory and the 
exigencies of specific cases.”264  This is problematic because, at least 
ideally, “the function of doctrine is both to implement the objectives 
attributed by theory to the Constitution and to offer principled grounds 
of justification for particular decisions.”265  Post emphasized that 
“[d]octrine becomes confused when the requirements of theory make 
little sense in the actual circumstances of concrete cases, or when 
doctrine is required to articulate the implications of inconsistent 
theories.  First Amendment doctrine has unfortunately suffered both 
from these difficulties.”266 
Is it possible, then, to reconcile First Amendment doctrine with free 
speech theory when it comes to fake news or, at the very least, to 
explain why First Amendment doctrine should protect fake news in the 
face of conflicting free speech theory?  Professor Steven Gey’s analysis 
of why speech denying the Holocaust – speech that, like this Article’s 
definition of fake news, is empirically verifiable as false – is 
safeguarded by the First Amendment provides a possible path 
forward.267  Gey examined the Holocaust denial issue through two First 
Amendment lenses – a structural rights interpretation and an individual 
rights interpretation.  Ultimately, he concluded that only the former 
understanding adequately explains why speech denying the existence of 
the Holocaust merits First Amendment protection.268  
Structural rights, as Gey defined them,269 are “constitutional 
provisions that structure the government’s interaction with its citizens 
and limit the power of government in order to prevent governmental 
overreaching and ensure over the long term the preservation of popular 
 
 261. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (providing this article’s definition of fake 
news).  
 262. Supra Part II.  
 263. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, in 
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 172-73 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey 
R. Stone eds., 2002). 
 264. Id. at 153. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See Gey, supra note 48 (examining how a structural rights interpretation supports protecting 
Holocaust-denial speech). 
 268. Id. at 17. 
 269. Gey, supra note 50, at 1.  
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consent to the exercise of political power.”270 Put differently, a structural 
rights perspective views the values of laws not in terms of the individual 
benefits they may yield, but rather in terms of the freedom from 
government control they produce.  As Gey posited, a structural rights 
interpretation “is entirely negative,”271 concentrating only “on the 
problematic nature of collective power.”272  This contrasts directly with 
an individual rights perspective, which focuses on “the social benefits 
arising from speech”273 and the “beneficial character”274 of protected 
speech.  
Thus, as applied to the First Amendment, “[t]he core of the structural 
rights justification for free speech is the claim that democratic self-
governance is inconsistent with a regime that permits political majorities 
to suppress free speech.”275  In other words, the government’s control 
over speech as an intellectual arbiter of the truth must be constricted, if 
not completely denied.276  Baked into the architecture of the First 
Amendment then – at least from a structural rights interpretation – is “a 
deep skepticism about the good faith of those controlling the 
government.”277  That skepticism flows from two facts: (1) decisions 
about what is true or false, when made by those in power, “are bound up 
with political perspectives that the government seeks to undermine;”278 
and (2) “the government’s natural tendency [is] to twist reality to its 
own purposes.”279   
One only needs to consider the current presidential administration’s 
use of so-called “alternative facts”280 as a vehicle to try to dictate what is 
true to understand Gey’s assertion above regarding the “government’s 
natural tendency to twist reality to its own purposes.”281  As Jim 
Rutenberg of the New York Times contends, the Trump administration’s 
communication “strategy has consistently presumed that low public 
opinion of mainstream journalism (which Mr. Trump has been only too 
happy to help stoke) creates an opening to sell the Trump version of 
 
 270. Id. at 4. 
 271. Gey, supra note 48, at 17. 
 272. Id. at 16. 
 273. Id. at 21. 
 274. Id. at 16. 
 275. Id. at 19. 
 276. See id. at 21 (“Under the structural interpretation, government is neither an intellectual nor a 
moral arbiter.”).  
 277. Id.  
 278. Id. at 22. 
 279. Id.  
 280. See David Jackson, Conway Backs Spicer’s Version of ‘Facts,’ USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 2017, 
at 3A (reporting the use of this term by White House counselor Kellyanne Conway during an interview 
on Meet the Press to dispute crowd-size estimates for the inauguration of President Donald J. Trump). 
 281. Gey, supra note 48, at 22. 
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reality, no matter its adherence to the facts.”282 
The structural rights approach thus explains why the speech of both 
Holocaust deniers and fake news purveyors must be shielded from 
government control.  In brief, the First Amendment must protect such 
speech not because of any benefits it provides to either truth discovery 
or voting wisely, but simply because a truly self-governing democracy 
cannot allow those temporarily vested with power to dictate what is true 
or false.  As Gey encapsulated, the government 
 
cannot suppress statements of fact simply because they are 
demonstrably untrue and may lead astray those who hear the 
statements and are too lazy or dim-witted to sort out truth from 
falsehood. Under the structural interpretation, government has no 
paternalistic role over matters of the intellect, just as it has no 
paternalistic role over matters of the soul.  It is up to individual 
citizens alone to sort out truth from falsehood.283 
 
In a nutshell, individuals who trade in fake news – “purveyors of 
nonsense,”284 to borrow Gey’s fine phrase about Holocaust deniers – are 
protected merely as “incidental beneficiaries of the ideological 
agnosticism”285 that is part and parcel of a structural rights interpretation 
of the First Amendment.   
Gey’s structural rights interpretation of the First Amendment, 
therefore, provides the intellectual glue holding doctrine and theory 
together.  While jettisoning fake news from the marketplace of ideas and 
keeping it out of the hands of voters may yield benefits, these gains are 
far outweighed by the danger of vesting the government with the power 
to determine truth from untruth.286  As Gey wrote, “[a]llowing the 
government to encourage truthfulness by punishing falsehood has the 
potential for lulling the citizenry into taking what the government says 
at face value.”287  Ultimately, focusing on the negative consequences of 
governmental interference with truth determinations in idea 
marketplaces and at metaphorical town hall meetings explains why the 
government must not be allowed to censor fake news.   
Alexander Meiklejohn contended that in a self-governing democracy 
 
 282. Jim Rutenberg, ‘Alternative Facts’ and The Costs of Trump’s Brand of Reality, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 2223, 2017, at B1 (emphasis added). 
 283. Gey, supra note 48, at 21. 
 284. Id. at 22. 
 285. Id.  
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 22.  
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“there is only one group – the self-governing people”288 and that 
“[r]ulers and ruled are the same individuals.”289  If that is correct, then 
he too might embrace a structural rights perspective of democratic self-
governance under which the “rulers” – those temporarily vested with 
power – must not be granted separate authority to tell the “ruled” what is 
and is not true.  Similarly, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who “did not 
believe in truth”290 and who recognized “no universal truths other than a 
pragmatic recognition of the universal Hobbesian reality that in politics 
the powerful always triumph over the powerless,”291 would surely 
embrace a structural rights interpretation of the marketplace theory that 
pushes back against government-dictated truths. 
The bottom line is that a structural rights approach to the First 
Amendment bridges the seeming disconnect between doctrine and 
theory described in Parts I and II when it comes to criminalizing the 
knowing creation and dissemination of fake news. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
“This story is FAKE NEWS and everyone knows it!”292 
 
That’s how Donald J. Trump responded on Twitter in March 2017 to 
allegations that his associates conspired with Russian officials to tilt the 
2016 presidential election in his favor.293  Although “fake news” is so 
loosely bandied about today that some consider the term meaningless,294 
Trump’s fixation with it,295 renders its proscription plausible,296 when 
coupled with his virulent anti-press sentiment297 and Hillary Clinton’s 
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post-election call for regulating fake news.298  
Using a precise definition of fake news that involves only verifiable 
falsehoods on matters of public concern,299 this Article asserted that 
criminalizing it to prevent voter confusion assuredly violates First 
Amendment doctrine.300  Yet, two free speech theories – the 
marketplace of ideas and democratic self-governance – upon which 
much of that doctrine ostensibly is premised, would likely not safeguard 
fake news from censorship.301  In brief, the Article illustrated an 
apparent disconnect between the First Amendment doctrine and theory. 
The Article contended, however, that a structural rights interpretation 
– one focusing neither on the benefits nor the “social good”302 of speech, 
but instead “on the problematic nature of collective power”303 – provides 
ample philosophical fodder for why the First Amendment protects 
empirically disprovable falsehoods like fake news from government 
control.304  Simply put, permitting the government to tell society what is 
and is not true is treacherous, for it vests officials temporarily in charge 
of the country with the power to twist narratives to serve their own 
purposes.305   
That is disturbingly akin to the function of the Ministry of Truth in 
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.306  Its “purpose was to dictate 
and protect the government’s version of reality.”307  As Professor Gey 
said,  
 
politicians’ claims of factual veracity should never be taken at face 
value – even when there is independent evidence that the 
government is actually correct.  This is not to say that the 
politicians are always wrong; it is to say that determinations of 
right and wrong should not be in the hands of politicians.308  
 
At bottom, the key is who gets to decide what content is appropriate 
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to circulate in the marketplace of ideas.  Rodney Smolla posits that “[i]n 
an open culture, that decision presumptively rests with speakers, not 
government officials, high or petty.”309  And while a self-governing 
democracy might function better without fabulist litter like fake news 
polluting the media ecosystem, trusting and relying on the government 
to paternalistically sweep it away only lulls voters into both indifference 
and passivity, rather than a “Holmesian skepticism”310 about what is 
true.  As John Stuart Mill might have phrased it, people must reject such 
“mental despotism.”311 
Although the government must not manage fake news, it does not 
logically follow that private actors and entities must be complacent.  To 
the contrary, individuals and businesses should combat fake news 
through both counterspeech and self-regulatory mechanisms, such as 
online social media platforms deploying algorithms to search for fake 
news and asking readers to flag its existence.312   
If the government is to play any part in fighting fake news, its role 
must be educational, not censorial.  This means ramping up digital 
media literacy efforts in the nation’s classrooms.313  Such remedies are 
especially important in an era when the nation’s president bypasses 
traditional news media channels and delivers messages directly to 
citizens via tweets.314  Ultimately, fact-checking conducted by news 
organizations and non-profit entities, along with both improved 
educational efforts and self-regulatory mechanisms, provide effective 
means for mitigating harms allegedly flowing from fake news while 
simultaneously safeguarding First Amendment rights.   
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